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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THREE D CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, DISTRIBUTORS 
INC. UTAH, a Utah corporation, 
LORIN S. MILLER, d/b/a 
WESTERN BATTERY MANUFACTURING, 
TED R. BROWN and WARREN B. 
BROWN, Trustee, 
Appellants, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 87-0011 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. What is the status of plaintiffs1 evidence on 
appeal from a Motion to Dismiss granted at the close of plaintiffs' 
evidence? 
II. Does a property owner have an established right 
of access to parking spaces shown on the building plans and 
used constantly following construction of the building many 
years ago? 
III. Will action in inverse condemnation lie where 
there is substantial loss of access but no physical appropriation? 
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IV. Will an action lie against Salt Lake City where 
there is substantial loss of access but no physical appropriation, 
following demand on Salt Lake City which was denied? 
V. Is there denial of reasonable access where parking 
spaces accessible from the street are made inaccessible directly? 
VI. Should the Court rule that a physical taking 
is an essential element of recovery where the City attempts 
to do in two separate proceedings what it started out to do 
in a single proceeding? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This action was tried on an Amended Complaint stating 
two (2) causes of action: First, in inverse condemnation against 
Salt Lake City for depriving appellants of their access to parking 
spaces in front of their buildings resulting from widening of 
the street and construction of a vertical curb; and secondly, 
an action for damages against Salt Lake City for loss of use 
of appellants1 parking spaces where no land was physically taken. 
Proceedings Below 
The original Complaint was for inverse condemnation 
only (Tr. 2-6) and following the receipt of defendant's First 
Memorandum (Tr. 14-19), a demand was made upon Salt Lake City 
to recognize the governmental immunity question (Tr. 27-29). 
Upon denial of the Motion to Dismiss (Tr. 30-32 and 59-61), 
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an Amended Complaint was filed (Tr. 13-19), including an action 
against Salt Lake City under the municipal claims statute on 
the possibility that inverse condemnation would not lie because 
it might be held that there was no physical taking (Tr. 77) . 
Upon the trial of the case, plaintiffs/appellants offered their 
evidence and rested. A Motion to Dismiss was argued and granted 
by the Court (Tr. 114). Proposed Findings of Fact were submitted 
by the respondent (Tr. 142-145) , objected to by appellants (Tr. 131-
135) , and argued to the Court. Some of the objections were 
ruled as well taken and were included in the ultimate Findings 
of Fact (Tr. 126-130). A Motion for New Trial and to Amend 
the Judgment further was filed and briefed in the Third District 
Court (Tr. 151-173) on April 28, 1986. No answering memorandum 
was filed and on August 8, appellants filed a Request for Ruling 
on the Motion for New Trial and submitted additional authorities 
to the Court (Tr. 174-218). The Court denied the Motion for 
New Trial on October 29 (Tr. 219) and because respondent did 
not submit an Order, the appellants finally submitted an Order 
Denying Motion for New Trial, which the Court signed December 
3, 1986 (Tr. 220). The Notice of Appeal was filed December 
29, 1986 (Tr. 222). 
Statement of Facts 
At the close of plaintiffs1 evidence, the motion of 
defendant to dismiss the action was granted (Tr. 114). The 
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Court accepted some of the appellants1 proposed additional Findings 
and rejected others, making nine (9) Findings of Fact as follows: 
1. Three-D Corporation is the owner of real 
property located at 238 West 1300 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, 
2. Warren B. Brown, Trustee, and Ted R. Brown 
are now the owners of real property located at 
234 West 1300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, which 
property is under lease to Distributors Inc. Colorado 
and Distributors Inc. Utah. 
3. On June 1, 1983, defendant commenced 
the construction of a Special Improvement District 
which provided for the installation of curb and 
gutter and the widening of the roadway of 1300 
South Street. 
4. In order to widen the boundaries of 1300 
South Street between 200 and 300 West Streets 
in Salt Lake City, Utah, the defendant attempted 
to purchase a portion of plaintiffs1 property 
which fronted on said street. 
5. The plaintiffs refused to sell any portion 
of their frontage property for the street widening 
project unless they were paid for damage to their 
property from loss of parking spaces. As a result, 
the City extended the roadway, widening only 
to the existing boundaries of 1300 South Street 
and no portion of the roadway or curb was constructed 
upon property owned by the [plaintiffs] . Two 
curb cuts were made allowing plaintiffs continued 
access to their property. 
6 . The building of each plaintiff was constructed 
with offices and areas for serving drop-in customers 
with sales and services, which buildings were 
so used from 1956 as to the Three D building 
and from 1957 as to the Distributors Inc. building. 
7. The placing of the curb at the property 
lines of the plaintiffs has prevented plaintiffs 
and their customers from driving from 1300 South 
Street directly into each of their angle parking 
spaces. 
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8, Lorin Miller is the Lessee of Three D 
Corporation and claims damage to his leasehold 
interest because of the loss of parking involved 
in this action, 
9. Said roadway widening eliminated the 
continued use of plaintiffs1 property as a parking 
area adjacent to the front of plaintiffs1 properties. 
However, two curb cuts were constructed so as 
to provide access to the subject properties [from] 
the roadway. (Tr. 126-130) 
The appellants had proposed additional Findings in 
the belief that they were supported by the evidence and should, 
therefore, be found by the Court in the expectation that sending 
up the transcript of testimony could be averted. 
A summary of the Findings as made and of the proposed 
Findings which were rejected may be useful to the Court in focusing 
on the factual issues. 
The Findings as made (Tr. 126-130) are recited above. 
In summary, these Findings are: 
Finding of Fact 1. Three D Corporation is 
the owner of 238 West 1300 South. 
Finding of Fact 2. Warren Brown as Trustee 
and Ted Brown are owners of 234 West 1300 South, 
which is under lease to Distributors Inc. 
Finding of Fact 3. Salt Lake City commenced 
construction of the Improvement District June 
1, 1983. 
Finding of Fact 4. Defendant attempted to 
purchase a strip of property from the appellants. 
Finding of Fact 5. Plaintiffs refused to 
sell unless they were paid for loss of parking 
and the City, therefore, widened only to the 
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boundaries of the street, allowing two curb cuts 
for continued access. 
Finding of Fact 6. Buildings were constructed 
by the plaintiffs to serve drop-in customers 
and were so used from 1956 and 1957 respectively. 
Finding of Fact 7. Curbs as built prevent 
plaintiffs and their customers from driving directly 
into the angle parking places in front of the 
buildings. 
Finding of Fact 8. Lorin Miller is lessee 
from Three D Corporation. 
Finding of Fact 9. Said widening of the 
street eliminated continued use of plaintiffs1 
property "as a parking area adjacent to the front 
of plaintiffs1 properties" but the two curb cuts 
provided access. 
The additional Findings proposed by appellants and 
rejected were numbered 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 (Tr. 136-141) 
and were briefly as follows: 
(6) Building permits were issued to appellants 
in 1956 and 1957 based upon applications with 
plot plans showing six parking spaces in front 
of the Three D building and seven parking spaces 
in front of the Distributors Inc. building. 
(9) The curb cuts as placed permit driving 
on to the area where there was previously a total 
of thirteen parking places, but this greatly 
reduces the number of usable parking places. 
(10) With the curb cuts as placed, a car 
driving on to the Three D parking area cannot 
go forward but must back out and on the Brown 
property, the vehicle must go forward or else 
back on to property beyond the property of that 
appellant. 
(11) None of the routes of access to parking 
places as previously used is now available. 
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(12) The loss of parking spaces has damaged 
the businesses on the premises and has reduced 
the value of the properties to a substantial 
extent. 
(13) The curb cuts placed for appellants1 
properties have a 3h or 4-inch vertical face, 
whereas curb cuts on all the other properties 
in the improvement district have a rounded face 
of approximately 1-inch in height, making use 
of the curb cuts in appellants1 property unpleasant 
and difficult. 
(14) Because of the unfinished condition 
left in front of appellants1 properties, water 
now accumulates on appellants1 properties without 
adequate drainage. 
The reason appellants ask this Court to review the 
evidence in the light of these requested additional Findings 
is for the purpose of bringing to the attention of the Court 
the specific facts and the nature and extent of the damage claimed 
by appellants, because the Court in its Conclusions of Law No. 2 
held that the restriction of access was not "so unreasonably 
as to make it a taking"; and in Conclusion 3, "Although plaintiffs 
suffered considerable damage ...", it wasn't enough; and in 
Conclusions 5 and 6 that because the City didn't go beyond the 
property line and failed to show a taking, there can be no recovery 
(Tr. 129). It is, of course, the position of the appellants 
that the closing of access to the parking areas, the restriction 
of use of the areas in front of the buildings, and the damages 
suffered by the appellants were so considerable and so great 
that this Court should hold that there was a taking and that 
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in any event, there was compensable damage. 
The evidence supporting these rejected Findings of 
Fact is in part as follows: 
Requested Finding No, 6 (Tr, 138) 
6. Building permits were issued by Salt Lake 
City in 1956 as to Three D Corporation and in 1957 
as to what is now the Brown property based upon applica-
tions with plot plans attached showing parking at 
the south end of the buildings on the owners1 property 
accessible from the street, six (6) parking spaces 
in front of the Three D building and seven (7) parking 
spaces in front of the Distributors Inc. building, 
as shown on some of the exhibits. 
This requested Finding requests two findings: (a) 
that building permits were issued for each of the buildings 
involved, and (b) that the applications for building permits 
showed parking places in front of the buildings. 
(a) John DeYoung at pages 261, 262 and 264 of the 
Transcript, stated that building permits were obtained for each 
of the buildings, although he no longer has the plans submitted. 
Ted Brown testified: 
I know the building permit was 
issued. (Tr. 373) 
Exhibit P-l shows the building permits issued 3/14/55 
for 238 West 1300 South and 11/19/56 for 234 West 1300 South. 
See also Exhibit D-31. There can be no doubt that a building 
permit was issued for each of the buildings. 
(b) The applications included plans showing front 
parking. 
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A Subpoena to the Archivist for City records brought 
Val Wilson before the Court, but he testified that the files 
for this period of the building inspector's department were 
not available (Tr. 260) . 
Exhibit D-28 includes Chapter 8 of Zoning, which provides 
in § 51-8-1 that off-street parking must be provided when any 
building or structure is erected, with adequate provisions for 
ingress or egress by standard-sized automobiles. The amount 
of parking required is set forth in § 51-8-3. It, therefore, 
appears that the application for building permits must have 
shown where the off-street parking was to be and that it was 
sufficient in quantity. 
Mr. DeYoung testified that the plans on which the 
permit was issued have "long since gone down the drain." The 
buildings were set back from the street "so they could have 
trucks or cars park in front, pull up and go in the building" 
(Tr. 262) . Ted Brown testified that the plans submitted showed 
the parking, and they were drawn on the plans with dividing 
strips between the parking spaces, and they allowed parking 
in the front of the building (Tr. 357) . But he also testified 
that his copy of the plans was loaned to a distributor in California 
and are no longer available but that he was very familiar with 
them (Tr. 356) . 
Warren Brown testified that from the very beginning 
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there were "seven marked stalls across the front of the building 
on an angle" in addition to other parking (Tr. 299) and that 
the building was constructed for them and to meet their requirements 
(Tr. 301). 
Lorin Miller also testified that he had occupied the 
building at 238 West 1300 South from the very beginning and 
that it was built for his occupancy and to accommodate his business 
and his design and that 
The parking that was provided 
was in front of the building * * * 
and the parking was in the front 
of the building, as I recall were 
six or eight places that we parked. 
And they utilized the parking from the beginning and their customers 
parked there (Tr. 381). 
It thus appears plain and not disputed that the plans 
which supported the application for the building permit included 
front parking for both buildings and that the front parking 
was utilized from the very first use of the buildings and that 
the buildings were designed to utilize the front parking spaces. 
Requested Finding No. 9 (Tr. 138) 
9. The placing of the cuts in the said curb 
permits plaintiffs and their customers to drive across 
and onto the spaces where there was formerly parking 
almost perpendicular to the property line of 1300 
South Street and parking a vehicle parallel to 1300 
South Street, greatly reducing the number of parking 
spaces that can be utilized. 
The wording of this request could be improved, but 
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its meaning is clear that the placing of the curbs in front 
of the two buildings has greatly reduced the number of parking 
spaces, regardless of whether the effective parking space now 
available is one or two in front of each building. 
It is clear that from the beginning there were seven 
parking places in front of No. 234 and six in front of No. 238. 
See Warren Brown at Tr. 299, 326, 337, 348 and 350. See George 
Fujii at Tr. 466, 473, 475 and 486. See Lorin Miller at Tr. 381. 
Exhibits P-5, P-6 and P-7 show the area originally 
proposed to be taken and how a curbing would make the area inacces-
sible directly from the street. Exhibit P-48 shows how the 
curbing has restricted the parking, eliminating parking virtually 
perpendicular to the street and compelling off-street parallel 
parking with the restrictions which result from cars being parked 
in the area. Warren Brown testified that originally there were 
seven stalls across the front (Tr. 299) and only two can park 
in the area since the curb was put in (Tr. 296) . The same testimony 
appears at Tr. 348 and 350. 
Requested Finding No, 10 (Tr, 139) 
10. In the case of plaintiff Three D's property, 
a vehicle now parking in front of the building cannot 
go forward but must back out to the curb cut; and 
in the case of the Brown property, such a vehicle 
must go forward and cannot back out without going 
beyond plaintiff's property. 
This request is simply a refinement of No. 9. It 
is only logical that when the curb was placed and cars could 
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not drive over the curb, drivers were compelled to enter the 
parking area at the east with the flow of traffic and park parallel 
on appellants1 properties and then exit to the west in the case 
of No. 234 and by backing up in the case of No. 238. This is 
indicated in the photographs which are Exhibits D-30 and D-44 
and the drawing which is Exhibit P-48. 
Henry Moore testified that cars parked in front of 
his place of business cannot proceed to the west but must back 
up in order to get out, thereby leaving only one usable parking 
space where there used to be six (Tr. 448-449) . 
George Fujii testified that basically there is one 
effective parking place in front of each building (Tr. 487) . 
The pictures which are Exhibits D-30 and D-44 show the curb 
and that there is no exit to the west from the Three D building, 
not only because the property is owned by someone else but because 
there is no curb cut to the west. 
Requested Finding No. 11 (Tr, 139) 
11. None of the routes of access to parking 
available to plaintiffs and their customers before 
the curbs were put in by the defendant is now available. 
This is simply the statement of an obvious but important 
fact. Whereas cars previously drove onto the front of the two 
lots from the right-hand traffic lane going west, they would 
now encounter curbs which are built to prevent access across 
them to the property. The real inquiry then as to requested 
13 
Finding No. 11 is whether there was direct access to the parking 
stalls previously. 
Exhibit P-47 shows that there was room to back out 
without impeding the flow of traffic prior to the construction 
of the curb. By reason of the improvements made, 1300 South 
was changed from a land service street with one lane in each 
direction to a traffic service street with two lanes in each 
direction and occupying the entire street to the curb (George 
Fujii, Tr. 472). Exhibits D-25, P-39, P-40 and P-45 show the 
change that has been made in the street. There was no curb 
or gutter or barrier before the late so-called improvements 
(George Fujii, Tr. 508, 533-534; Gene Fisher, Tr. 549; Lorin 
Miller, Tr. 381; Ted Brown, Tr. 359; Warren Brown, Tr. 326). 
Now the curb absolutely blocks access via the established rights 
of way. 
Requested Finding No. 12 (Tr, 139) 
12. The loss of parking spaces resulting from 
the building of the curb has damaged the businesses 
conducted on the premises and has reduced the value 
of the properties to a substantial extent. 
Plaintiffs realize that the Court has found and ruled 
that there is no compensable taking involved in this action 
and that there remains reasonable access to the areas in front 
of the buildings. But all of the evidence was that the plaintiffs 
have suffered extensive damage through the placing of the curbs 
and the elimination of the front parking spaces. There is not 
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unanimity as to the extent of the damage or the best way to 
calculate that damage, but there was no testimony that the businesses 
and the properties have not been substantially damaged and many 
testified that there was great damage. The Court stated at 
Tr. 5 94 that the measure of damage is diminution in the value 
of the property, apparently preferring that to other methods 
of determining the amount of damage. 
There is clear testimony that loss of parking and 
the construction of the curbing caused substantial damage to 
the appellants. George Fujii, an M.A.I, appraiser, testified 
that, based on diminution in the value of the properties, the 
damage suffered by plaintiff Three D Corporation from loss of 
parking was $8,400 (Tr. 477, 485, 486) and that the damage to 
the appellants Brown and Distributors was $62,700 (Tr. 485 and 
486). This is itemized in Exhibit P-48. Gene Fisher, Property 
Manager and Vice President of Three D Corporation, testified 
that the damage was $2 per day per stall (Tr. 541) . Doris D. Dipo, 
principal owner of Three D Corporation, testified that the damage 
to her property was $5,000 per parking stall lost and that five 
(5) stalls were lost (Tr. 552-553). Henry Moore, Lessee in 
the front part of the Three D building, testified that the loss 
of parking was so serious that he had to change his method of 
doing business by going to the customers instead of asking them 
to come to his place of business (Tr. 445-446) . Plaintiff Ted 
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Brown testified that the loss of parking compelled a change 
in their method of doing business (Tr. 364 and 568); that this 
loss caused the business to go from a good profit to a big loss 
(Tr. 368); the owners lost $64,000 in the sale of the building 
because of the lack of parking which over the period of the 
five and one-half year lease equals $108,620 (Tr. 570); and 
that the loss of parking cost the business $1,800 per month 
(Tr. 605). Appellant Warren Brown testified that the actual 
damage to the property, which was realized when the property 
was sold, was $64,000 (Tr. 322); and that sale of the property 
was necessary to replace the parking (Tr. 325). Lorin Miller, 
lessee of the Three D building and occupant of the rear portion, 
testified that his out-of-pocket expenses through loss of parking 
were $10 to $20 per day (Tr. 392). 
The City's own appraisers found that there was substantial 
damage from loss of parking (David Hales, Tr. 288-289 and Exhibits 
P-13 and P-14). Their appraiser found damage of $6,900 for 
Three D Corporation and $7,700 for the Brown property (Tr. 288). 
The appraiser found $3,600 as the value of the three parking 
stalls he admitted to have been lost in front of each property 
(Tr. 289) . 
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Requested Finding No* 13 (Tr. 139) 
13. The curb cuts placed for access to the properties 
of plaintiffs have approximately four-inch (4") verticle 
face, whereas the curb cuts to all other properties 
on the 1300 South Street project have a rounding face 
of approximately one-inch (lw) height, making use 
of said curb cuts unpleasant and difficult. 
The purpose of requesting this Finding was to show 
that the City planned special treatment for these two property 
owners, who elected to challenge the City's plans. Not only 
did the City gerrymander the entire job by putting in curb and 
gutter in front of every building except the two owned by the 
appellants, but they also refused to give reasonably usable 
driveway entrances by putting in a three and one-half to four-inch 
(3% to 4") vertical block instead of a one-inch (1") rolled 
entrance to the driveway. This request goes along with Request 
No. 14, which will be next considered, and which taken together 
show that the present state of affairs must be temporary and 
ultimately there must be a curb and gutter and sidewalk in front 
of these two properties to make a reasonable improvement district. 
Appellant Ted Brown testified that at the entrance 
to what the City calls the driveway is an abrupt, high curb 
three and one-half inches (3V1) high, which you can't drive 
over, instead of a real driveway (Tr. 423) , and that the usable 
driveway to the East of his building leads to the neighbor's 
property on the East; and the only other approach is to the 
West between the two buildings where there is a curb 3V1 high 
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across the property (Tr. 425), as illustrated in Exhibits P-39 
and P-40. 
Exhibit P-39 shows in the foreground the driveway 
that leads to the neighbor's property to the East and then the 
abrupt curb just in the foreground from the "No Parking" sign, 
with the driveway between the two buildings shown beyond the 
truck parked in the picture. Exhibit P-40 shows the Diamond 
Glass front, which is the Three D building, and just beyond 
that is the driveway referred to in Mr. Ted Brown's testimony, 
which has a three and one-half inch (3Vf) curb instead of a 
usable driveway. The immediate foreground of Exhibit P-40 is 
not a driveway at all but simply an abrupt curb. This curb 
is shown better in Exhibit P-41, which shows the 3hn abrupt 
curb in the middle of the picture, with the much higher abrupt 
curb both in the immediate foreground and beyond the driveway. 
Exhibit P-45 shows the easterly curb of which Mr. Brown testified. 
The appraiser George Fujii testified that Exhibit 
P-4 5 shows the high curb in front of the Distributors building 
and the curb cut in the concrete, which is three and one-half 
to four inches (3% to 4") high. It is also shown in Exhibit 
P-39 (Tr. 468-469). He further testified at Tr. 501 about this 
picture and that the abrupt curb plus the parking signs tends 
to intimidate would-be customers so that there is only one effective 
parking place in front of the Three D building. 
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Exhibit D-19 shows the smooth driveway East of the 
Distributors building, which leads to the neighbor's property, 
as contrasted with the abrupt 3h" curb to the left of it in 
that picture. 
It also appears from the testimony and the Exhibit 
pictures that the City gave special and unfavorable treatment 
to the street and the curbs and the lack of sidewalk in front 
of the property of the appellants. This plainly appears in 
Exhibits D-25, D-30, D-36, P-39, P-40 and D-41, which show that 
a curb and sidewalk are placed in front of the properties except 
the appellants1 properties, where there is an abrupt curb with 
no gutter and no sidewalk, resulting in a depression which accumu-
lates water, the whole being unsightly and unfinished and indicating 
rather plainly that before the project is finally finished, 
there will have to be a continuation of the regular curb past 
the appellants1 properties and the placing of a sidewalk. This 
is the testimony also of appellant Ted Brown (Tr. 426-428, 468-469) 
and of George Fujii (Tr. 501-503). 
Exhibit D-18, the appraisal made for the City, shows 
that this Special Improvement District was planned as a uniform 
district, with curbs and sidewalks on both sides and involving 
the taking of a portion of property from each of the thirty-two 
(32) owners. This appears from the letter in the front of the 
exhibit dated October 29, 1982, which shows property to be taken 
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from all of the abutting owners including the appellants as 
Parcel No's. 106 and 107, with the intention of providing uniform 
sidewalks indicated at page 7 of that letter in the bottom paragraph, 
which also recognizes that an increased parking problem will 
result from the building of the project. This original plan 
is also made plain in. letters from the respondent (Exhibits 
P-2, P-5 and P-6). 
Requested Finding No, 14 (Tr, 139) 
14. The resultant conditions of the properties 
of the plaintiffs are that water from their properties 
and from the gutter in front of the other properties 
now washes on to the front of the property of plaintiffs 
and accumulates there without draining and there is 
a sidewalk in front of all the other properties on 
1300 South Street except in front of the properties 
of plaintiffs, as shown on the photographs in evidence. 
The second part of this requested Finding as to there 
being a sidewalk in front of all properties except these two 
was approved by the Court, but it didn't get into the actual 
Findings (Tr. 139 and 128). We think it is only reasonable 
to go a step further and show that a gutter is needed to drain 
the water which is now accumulating in front of the buildings 
of these two plaintiffs. The pictures which are Exhibits P-39 
and P-40 show how the water is puddling at the present time. 
The need for correcting this is shown also by the testimony 
of Henry Moore (Tr. 449-450) and George Fujii (Tr. 502). It 
is plain from the pictures that the improvement district is 
incomplete and that ultimately the curb barrier will be replaced 
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by a curb and gutter and the puddling area will be replaced 
by a sidewalk so as to make a uniform and attractive improvement 
district and a decent looking street. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. Credible evidence offered by the plaintiffs-
appellants should be considered by the Court as established 
facts on a Motion to Dismiss. The failure of the trial judge 
to make the requested Findings cannot be for lack of credible 
and uncontradicted evidence but because the trial judge apparently 
believed that the additional facts relied on by the appellants 
were superfluous because there was no physical taking of property 
and because there was some access to the impacted property. 
II. The building permits issued for the buildings 
constructed by the plaintiffs or for the plaintiffs were issued 
in reliance on plans showing as off-street parking in part, 
angled parking in front of each building so as to permit retail 
services from those portions of those buildings. The buildings 
were constructed in reliance on these parking rights. The closing 
of these established routes of access amounts to a taking of 
property rights even though no physical portion of the property 
is actually occupied by the improvement. 
III. The respondent developed the project in a manner 
which did not require condemnation action, although portions 
of the properties of all owners except the two appellants1 properties 
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were physically taken and paid for. These appellants had well-
established and valuable rights of access to these parking spaces. 
In those circumstances an action in inverse condemnation will 
lie. 
IV. Should the Court hold either that inverse condem-
nation will not lie under any circumstances or that it will 
not lie where there is no physical taking of a piece of land, 
then the appellants rely on the demand made against Salt Lake 
City for compensation for interference with their established 
parking rights and means of access to their properties from 
the street, which action lies under the governmental immunity 
statute, Utah Code Annotated, Title 63, Chapter 30. The claim 
is Exhibit P-8. 
V. This is really a refinement of Point II and 
is based more precisely on cases involving the closing of established 
access routes where the areas previously reached directly may, 
after the building of the improvement, be reached only indirectly. 
By reducing established parking places from six (6) to one (1) 
so far as plaintiff Three D is concerned and from seven (7) 
to two (2) as to Browns and Distributors, with one of those 
being a rather awkward access, the damage is so extreme that 
it is not permissible to say that reasonable access has been 
provided. The importance of specific parking places related 
to these two buildings constructed in reliance on the parking 
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is too immediate and too substantial to be glossed over with 
the phrase that "reasonable access" has been given. 
VI. The original project as planned by respondent 
Salt Lake City was to establish a wide street with uniform curbs, 
gutters and sidewalks on both sides of the entire project from 
150 East 1300 South to 400 West 1300 South. This uniformity 
was provided as to all properties except appellants1 two properties 
where an unsightly and impractical high curb abutted into the 
street and where no sidewalk whatsoever was provided, leaving 
a depressed, unsightly area subject to accumulation of surface 
water from street runoff. It is plain from the photographs 
and the testimony that ultimately Salt Lake City needs to take 
another step and make this a uniform special improvement district, 
thus accomplishing an ultimate physical taking without having 
to pay for the appurtenant parking rights. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHAT IS STATUS OF PLAINTIFFS' EVIDENCE ON 
APPEAL FROM A MOTION TO DISMISS GRANTED AT 
THE CLOSE OF PLAINTIFFS' EVIDENCE? 
Appellants endeavored to simplify the appeal by proposing 
additional Findings of Fact based on the evidence presented 
so as to show the nature of the underlying facts on which appellants 
rely. The trial judge accepted some of these additional requested 
Findings and rejected others, with no indication of his reasons. 
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Appellants recognize that Findings of Fact made upon 
a Motion to Dismiss following plaintiffs1 evidence in compliance 
with Rules 41(b) and 52(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure will 
be upheld unless the evidence is "unbelievable or insufficient 
in some regard" (Johnson v. Bell (Utah 1983)
 f 666 P.2d 308, 
311) and the Court will review the facts in the light most favorable 
to the Findings, assuming that the Court's Findings were "established 
by a preponderance of the evidence" (Lawrence v. Bamberger, 
3 Utah 2d 247, 282 P.2d 335); but the Findings as made do not 
preclude and are not inconsistent with additional and important 
facts upon which the trial court refused to make Findings. 
This is important where the nature of the rights involved are 
not general but specifically established and where the substituted 
access is "reasonable" as a generality but not where specific 
rights are involved and there is great damage resulting to the 
owners. 
We suggest that additional Findings may be made where 
the trial court refused to find a material fact, which was admitted 
or undisputed (Corsino v. Grover, 148 Conn. 299, 170 At.2d 267, 
9 5 ALR 2d 751) or where the meaning of the trial judge is not 
disclosed by the Findings as made. (Roseman v. Day, 345 Mass. 93, 
185 N.E.2d 650, 100 ALR 2d 459.) Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error, 
§ 900, suggests that the appellate court can make findings "where 
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the evidence was such, as a matter of law, as to require a particular 
finding." 
As stated in Corpus Juris Secundum, Appeal and Error, 
§ 1675, page 667: 
. • • where the facts are undisputed 
and the inferences are only one 
way, the appellate court may and 
should supply the finding. 
If the trial court erred in failing to make further 
Findings, it would expedite final determination if this Court 
could indicate whether there is substantial and uncontradicted 
evidence on the additional requested issues, rather than remand 
the case for further findings. 
The trial court found there was no physical taking 
of appellants1 property (Finding 5, Tr. 127-128) and that two 
(2) curb cuts allowed continued access to the property. But 
the Finding omits these undisputed facts: The buildings were 
based on building permits issued by Salt Lake City with plans 
showing off-street parking in front of the buildings, six (6) 
parking spaces in one, and seven (7) in front of the other, 
to accommodate retail services in the front of the buildings; 
and these spaces are now reduced to use by one car in front 
of one building and one or at most two in front of the other, 
resulting in necessary changed use and great loss of value in 
the properties. Established routes of access were blocked by 
the curb as constructed. 
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These additional facts must be taken into account to 
determine what the rights of access were, whether they are property 
rights, whether they have been substantially taken away and whether 
the resulting damage is so substantial as to be compensable. 
Additional Findings are needed also to show that the 
City originally planned uniform curbs, gutters, sidewalks and 
driveways, taking a piece of the property from each of the 32 
property owners, and then changed the plans because appellants 
insisted on compensation for loss of parking, then discriminated 
against appellants, leaving the district partially completed 
and destroying appellants1 property values by first going only 
to the property line, thus destroying the parking rights, so 
that when the property is later taken to make uniform the curb, 
gutter, sidewalk and driveways, there will no longer be any 
existing parking rights. It was because of this situation that 
the appellants asked the court to take judicial notice of a 
very similar action in Salt Lake County. Salt Lake County v. Build-
ers Milling Supply, No. 228714 (Tr. 233). A condemnation action 
was brought whereby a strip of property abutting the street 
was taken, this being property where there were established 
parking rights. The verdict of the jury was to award substantial 
damage ($31,728.75 - p. 41 of that file) for loss of these parking 
rights, which situation would have existed as to the rights 
of plaintiffs if the City had proceeded with its announced uniform 
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plan to take a strip of property from each of the abutting owners 
so as to make a uniform Special Improvement District with a 
widened street, curbs, gutters and sidewalks. (This file is 
lodged with the exhibits in this case.) 
It is not possible to make a cohesive attack on the 
Conclusions of Law without having before this Court the complete 
facts, the rights of appellants, and the extent of damages suffered. 
Appellants would concede that if no specific parking 
rights exist and no specific access to those parking rights, 
and the City wants to widen the street thereby increasing traffic 
and there is only a reasonable interference with appellants' 
access to their properties, and only slight damages, there would 
be no cause of action and the Conclusions of Law should stand. 
If this Court cannot examine the additional facts 
established by the evidence and omitted from the Findings of 
the trial court, then the case should be remanded for further 
Findings on the establishment of parking rights and access routes, 
the construction of buildings in reliance on the approved plans, 
the extent of restrictions resulting from the improvements as 
they now exist, and the extent of damage to property values 
of appellants. There should also be Findings as to the original 
intent of the City, the reason for the change, and the half-
finished curb, gutter and sidewalk area in front of appellants1 
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properties, which will ultimately be changed through a taking 
of a strip of their property. 
POINT II 
DOES A PROPERTY OWNER HAVE AN ESTABLISHED 
RIGHT OF ACCESS TO PARKING SPACES SHOWN ON 
THE BDILDING PLANS AND USED CONSTANTLY FOLLOWING 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE BDILDING MANY YEARS AGO? 
Finding 6 (Tr. 128) includes construction of the buildings 
and use of the buildings for many years. This omits the fact 
that the construction was based on building permits, which are 
plainly documented (Ex. P-1 and D-31) with plans showing the 
parking. Unfortunately, the plans have been lost by the City 
(Tr. 260) and by the builder (Tr. 262) and by the appellants 
(Tr. 356) , but the testimony was plain and not disputed that 
the plans showed off-street parking in front of the buildings 
and that the buildings were constructed to utilize the front 
parking spaces. (See the Statement of Facts, pages 8 to 10.) 
The Utah Constitution says: 
Private property shall not be 
taken or damaged for public use 
without just compensation. (Article 
I, Section 22) (Emphasis supplied) 
In Dooly Block v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit (1893), 
9 Utah 31, 33 P. 229, the issue was whether the defendant could 
construct a street railroad track so close to the property of 
the plaintiff as to make it difficult for the plaintiff to use 
its property. The Court noted that the street could be owned 
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by the City or by the abutting owners and said: 
In either case the abutters have 
the right to have the street kept 
open and not obstructed so as 
to interfere with their easements, 
and materially diminish the value 
of their property . . . These 
rights were inducements to purchasers, 
became a part of the purchase, 
are appurtenances to the land 
which cannot be so embarrassed 
or abridged as to materially interfere 
with its proper use and enjoyment, 
and they are, in effect, property 
of which the owners cannot be 
deprived without due compensation* 
(p. 232) 
In that case there were no specific routes of access which had 
been used by the plaintiff and which were being interfered with. 
This Dooly case was referred to in Utah Road Commission 
v. Hansen, 14 Utah 2d 305, 383 P.2d 917, which was decided against 
the property owner. The defendant operated a wrecking yard 
one block long, the easterly portion of which had been developed 
and had a definite access way established, whereas the westerly 
half was undeveloped and it was this westerly half which was 
being impacted by the widening and improving of the arterial 
highway. 
This Court noted that if there were an established 
easement of access "and we agree that where such is taken it 
would constitute the taking of property covered by our eminent 
domain statute" (p. 309), and made a point of the fact that 
as to the westerly portion, "No existing easement to their remaining 
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land having been taken, no compensation is required" (p. 310) , 
observing that, "An easement of access contemplates a traveled 
way from the property to the highway." By this test we have 
established easements of access to the six (6) parking places 
and seven (7) parking places, although the Finding of Fact does 
not go so far as to state that there are that number of parking 
spaces and that they have historically been approached separately 
and from the street, thus constituting thirteen (13) established 
easements of access. 
Hampton v. State of Utah through its Road Commission 
(1968), 21 Utah 2d 342, 445 P.2d 708, was an action in inverse 
condemnation where the plaintiffs alleged a substantial and 
material impairment of access to their property constituting 
a taking, which the trial court had dismissed on the ground 
of sovereign immunity but which was reversed by this Court for 
determination of whether the plaintiffs1 property had in fact 
been taken by denial of their free and convenient access to 
their property. This case squarely holds that a substantial 
and material impairment of access is a taking but does not define 
what material and substantial impairment amounts to. Again, 
we refer this Court to the facts of this case, which were not 
covered by a Finding, although requested, to the effect that 
thirteen (13) parking places were established in accordance 
with building plans and were accessed from the street regularly 
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and continuously, that they were blocked by Salt Lake City's 
curb and that the damage in the form of diminution of property 
values was great. 
Keiffer v. King County (1977), 89 Wash.2d 369, 572 
P.2d 408. This Washington case is the closest we have come 
to a case in point. We submit that no Utah decision closes 
the door on our action. The question is how much have we been 
damaged through loss of parking spaces and that was the question 
decided in Keiffer v. King County. The headnote of this case 
read: 
Owners of commerc i a l p r o p e r t y 
sough t damages from a county on 
t h e t h e o r y t h a t , by i n s t a l l i n g 
c u r b i n g a long the a d j a c e n t road 
r i g h t - o f - w a y , the county had so 
i m p a i r e d acces s t o the p r o p e r t y 
as t o e f f e c t an u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
t a k i n g of such p r o p e r t y w i thou t j u s t compensa t ion . The Super io r 
Court, King County, Robert W. Winsor, 
J . , found a compensable t a k i n g , 
and t h e c o u n t y a p p e a l e d . The 
Supreme C o u r t , U t t e r , J . , he ld 
t ha t subs t an t i a l evidence supported 
the t r i a l c o u r t ' s f inding . 
The Cour t ' s own statement of the case i s as fol lows: 
Two issues are presented on appeal : 
(1) under what c i r c u m s t a n c e s may 
the r e s t r i c t i o n of access to p r iva t e 
proper ty , r e s u l t i n g from the construc-
t i o n of p h y s i c a l b a r r i e r s located 
within the governmental r ight-of-way 
d e s i g n e d t o r e g u l a t e t h e f low 
of t r a f f i c i n t o and out of such 
p rope r ty , c o n s t i t u t e a compensable 
t a k i n g ; and (2) d i d t h e t r i a l 
court e r r in t r e a t i n g the determination 
of degree of impairment as a quest ion 
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of fact. We find the Superior 
Court resolved these issues correctly 
and affirm its order. 
In that case a two-lane road was widened to become 
four lanes and curbs were erected on the edge of the improved 
road within the right-of-way and for the purpose of reducing 
traffic hazard, which would exist if vehicles were allowed to 
back onto the roadway from the respondents1 property out of 
their parking places as they had previously done. This resulted 
in reducing the parking places from eighteen cars to at most 
five cars in front of the plaintiffs1 buildings. The Court 
treated each of these parking places as a unit and the trial 
court found that the curb and the curb cuts denied 
. . . reasonable access to the 
parking which is functionally 
necessary to utilize each of such 
structures for their highest and 
best use and/or the businesses 
being operated therein. 
The Court held that total elimination of access is 
not necessary to create liability (although in our case there 
is total elimination of access over the means which had been 
established and used for many years), but the question is whether 
there is a substantial impairment, which is a question of either 
fact or law. There the reduction was from eighteen to five. 
Here it is from thirteen to three. 
Other cases holding there is a taking of property 
rights where right of access is impeded or impaired and no land 
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is taken are: Morris v. Oregon Short Line, 36 Utah 14, 102 
P. 629, 631; Farris v. City of Twin Falls (1959), 81 Idaho 583, 
347 P.2d 996, 998; Oklahoma Turnpike Authority v. Chandler 
(Okla. 1957), 316 P.2d 828, 829, 832; City of Chicago v. Holt 
(Minn.Ct.App. 1985), 360 N.W.2d 390; In re Sansom Street in 
City of Philadelphia, 143 A. 134, 136; Miller v. City of Beaver 
Falls (Superior Court Pa. 1951) 182 A.2d 34, 36-38; Troup v. New 
Bethlehem Borough, 122 Pa. Super. 198, 186 A. 306; Filler v. City 
of Minot (N.D. 1979), 281 N.W.2d 237, 242. 
It is clear from the cases, including the Utah cases, 
that there is a taking when rights of access are impeded, impaired 
or restricted and whether that is compensable depends on the 
extent of the damage. 
The trial judge was misled by the fact that there 
was no physical taking of land. In Conclusion of Law No. 2 
(Tr. 128), the Court concluded that installation of the curb 
did not restrict access "so unreasonably as to make it a taking 
within the meaning of Utah law" and then in Conclusion of Law 
No. 6 held that plaintiffs have failed to show a taking. 
The extent of the taking and the resultant damage 
are not covered by the Court's Findings and the actual facts 
need to be considered by this Court to determine that there 
was a complete closing of all of the former routes of access 
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and that this was definitely a taking which resulted in very 
great damage. 
POINT III 
WILL ACTION IN INVERSE CONDEMNATION LIE 
WHERE THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL LOSS OF ACCESS 
BUT NO PHYSICAL APPROPRIATION? 
In the Court's final judgment there was no point made 
that remedy in the form of inverse condemnation was improper. 
the following cases, cited under Point II, sustain the remedy 
by action in the form of inverse condemnation where there was 
no physical taking of land but only impairment of access: Hampton 
v. State of Utah, supra; Dooly v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit, supra; 
Morris v. Oregon Short Line, supra; Farris v. City of Twin Falls, 
supra; Oklahoma Turnpike Authority v. Chandler, supra; Filler 
v. City of Minot, supra; Troup v. New Bethlehem Borough, supra; 
and Finkelstein v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Pa.Cmnwlth, 
354 A.2d 14. 
POINT IV 
WILL AN ACTION LIE AGAINST SALT LAKE CITY 
WHERE THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL LOSS OF ACCESS 
BUT NO PHYSICAL APPROPRIATION, FOLLOWING 
DEMAND ON SALT LAKE CITY WHICH WAS DENIED? 
The Memorandum Decision of the trial court disposing 
of defendant-respondent's Motion to Dismiss for failure to comply 
with the Governmental Immunity Act made considerable point of 
the question whether there was a "taking." The Court said: 
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It remains to be seen whether 
the facts will bear out a taking 
in the legal sense. (Tr. 30-32) 
Because of this issue on the Governmental Immunity 
Act and the Court's problem with the matter of "taking," claim 
was filed with Salt Lake City on July 9, 1984 (Ex. P-8) . The 
Complaint was thereafter amended to include a Second Cause of 
Action based on denial of that claim (Tr. 77-79). This was 
done for the purpose of fitting into the Court's Memorandum 
Decision suggesting that if there was no taking in the legal 
sense, there might still be a remedy under the Governmental 
Immunity Act. 
This Court reviewed the Governmental Immunity Act 
with reference to impaired access of property in St. George, 
Utah, in Holt v. Utah State Road Commission (1973), 30 Utah 
2d 4, 511 P. 2d 1286. In that case there was the construction 
of an underpass on public property, which impaired access to 
the plaintiff's property. The court said: 
There is no taking of property 
involved in this action." 
and said that in the absence of a taking, there is no recovery 
for damages even though the construction "may impair or adversely 
affect the convenience of access to property" and went on to 
say that Section 63-30-6, U.C.A. 1953, must be narrowly interpreted 
and gives no remedy in the absence of a taking. The court did 
not mention the fact that the Constitution in Article I, Section 
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22, protects against damage to property as well as the taking 
of property. 
Holt c i t e s s ix (6) Utah cases as supporting t h i s s tatement: 
The law has long been es tab l i shed 
i n t h i s S t a t e t h a t under t h o s e 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h e r e can be no 
recovery from the Sta te for damages 
b e c a u s e t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a 
highway may impair or a d v e r s e l y 
a f f e c t t he convenience of access 
to proper ty . 
The f i r s t of t h e s e i s S t a t e v . Four th D i s t r i c t Court (1937), 
94 Utah 384, 78 P. 2d 502. This Court granted a Writ of Prohib i t ion 
a g a i n s t t he S t a t e Road Commission from proceeding to build a 
viaduct in the center of a publ ic s t r e e t in Provo without making 
a r rangements wi th a b u t t i n g proper ty owners to compensate them 
for impairment of access , although t h e i r p roper t i e s would continue 
to abut on the s t r e e t . 
This Court sa id : 
. Under t h e p r o v i s i o n s of 
t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n of t h i s S t a t e , 
a p a r t y , whose p r o p e r t y i s about 
t o be s p e c i a l l y damaged in any 
s u b s t a n t i a l d e g r e e f o r p u b l i c 
u s e , has the same r i g h t s and i s 
g i v e n the same remedies for t he 
p r o t e c t i o n of h i s p r o p e r t y from 
t h e t h r e a t e n e d i n j u r y as would 
be accorded him i f h i s p r o p e r t y 
were ac tua l ly taken and appropriated 
for such use . (p. 393) 
I t went on t o say t h a t where no s u i t in condemnation i s going 
to be i n s t i t u t e d , a c o u r t of e q u i t y could t ake j u r i s d i c t i o n 
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where the only other remedy would be presenting a claim to the 
Board of Examiners (p. 396) and that the protection of Section 
22 of Article I of the Constitution applies 
. . . whether the injury complained 
of by the plaintiffs in the injunction 
suit is considered a 'taking1 
of property, or a 'damaging1 of 
property. (p. 397) 
and again: 
We be l i eve , however, tha t in incor-
p o r a t i n g i n t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a 
provision requi r ing j u s t compensation 
f o r p r o p e r t y damaged for p u b l i c 
u s e , i t was i n t e n d e d to put an 
end t o such c o n t r o v e r s y and to 
p ro tec t the damaged property owner 
e q u a l l y wi th the p r o p e r t y owner 
whose land was phys ica l ly entered 
upon. (p. 39 8) 
and again: 
We t h i n k i f a case a r i s e s where 
there i s no other method of enforcing 
a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t e x c e p t 
by s u i t a g a i n s t t he S t a t e , then 
i t must be c o n s i d e r e d t h a t t h e 
S t a t e has g i v e n i t s consen t t o 
be sued in such a case . 
and the Court p r o h i b i t e d p roceed ings u n t i l a r rangements had 
been made to compensate the p l a i n t i f f s . 
The second case was Hjor th v . Whi t t enburg , e t a l . 
(1952) , 121 Utah 324, 241 P.2d 907. There s u i t was brought 
a g a i n s t t he i n d i v i d u a l Road Commissioners for al leged damage 
to property where the Road Commission had ra i sed the grade four 
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feet in front of the plaintiff's property. The Court held that 
the individuals were not liable, but here there is no treatment 
of the nature of the right of access or the remedy for interfering 
with it. 
The third case was Fairclough v. Salt Lake County 
(I960), 10 Utah 2d 417, 354 P.2d 105. There the County had 
lowered the grade to 16 feet below plaintifffs land, thereby 
causing considerable inconvenience of access to the plaintiff 
and the Court held that sovereign immunity was not waived for 
such damage and that the Constitutional provision was not self-
executing. There was no mention in the case of whether there 
was already a means of access to the road or an established 
access to the roadway or whether it was possible to reach the 
roadway or in what manner before or after. 
The fourth case was Springville Banking v. State Road 
Commission (1960), 10 Utah 2d 100, 349 P.2d 157. This was an 
action in mandamus to compel members of the State Road Commission 
to initiate eminent domain proceedings to assess damages allegedly 
caused by impairment of access to plaintiff's property, which 
would result from placing a concrete island in the middle of 
a street in Springville, Utah, thereby compelling southbound 
traffic to make a U-turn and go extra distance to reach the 
plaintiff's property. The Court held that the action would 
not lie and that this was the type of burden property owners 
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were compelled to bear as members of the public and noted that 
plaintiff did not allege any great damage or special burden 
with this statement: 
On the other hand, if public officials 
act arbitrarily and unreasonably, 
causing, for example, total destruction 
of the means to get in and out 
of one's property, without any 
reasonable justification for doing 
so in the public interest, in 
a manner that imposes a special 
burden on one not shared by the 
public generally, principles of 
equity no doubt could be invoked 
to prevent threatened action of 
such character or to remove any 
instrumentality born of such conduct, 
(p. 103) 
The fifth case is State v. Parker (1961), 13 Utah 
2d 65, 368 P. 2d 585, where an owner near highway construction 
sought to intervene in an action to show consequential damage 
to his property from vibration and noise. The Court noted that 
the moving party's property was not connected to the condemned 
tract and there was no discussion of taking or closing an easement 
of access or any other easement. 
The sixth case was Anderson Investment Corp. v. State 
of Utah (1972), 28 Utah 2d 379, 503 P.2d 144. This was an action 
for injunction against constructing a viaduct in the middle 
of the street, alleging that there would be diminution of the 
easements of light, air, view and access. The construction 
of the viaduct approach would compel customers of the plaintiff 
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to make a U-turn and travel extra distance to reach the property, 
much as in Springville Banking v. Road Commission, supra. In 
a footnote the Court said the State was immune from the suit 
to enjoin "even if action for damage would lie for interference 
with plaintiff's easements," suggesting that such an action 
would lie, given sufficient damage. 
In the light of Hampton, supra, Miya, infra, and Keiffer, 
supra, a re-examination of applicable remedies for what is plainly 
prohibited by the Constitution seems appropriate. 
The year after Holt, in Utah State Road Commission 
v. Miya (1974), 526 P.2d 926, the court reviewed a case from 
Davis County where a piece of land was taken and then a viaduct 
was constructed on that land and on the adjoining street, which 
impaired Miya's easement of view, and the unsightly viaduct 
damaged his remaining property, which had a highest and best 
use for residential purposes and this use was damaged to the 
extent of $8,000. The court observed that a median divider, 
which only interferes with the free flow of traffic in front 
of a property, does not entitle the owner to compensation and 
went on to say: 
However , where a p o l i c e power 
i s e x e r c i s e d as an i n c i d e n t a l 
r e s u l t of the exerc ise of eminent 
domain, j u s t compensat ion i s due 
if the market value of the property 
has been diminished. The Const i tu-
t i ona l guarantee of j u s t compensation 
f o r t h e t a k i n g or damaging of 
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p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y for p u b l i c use 
i s in no way affected by the fac t 
t h a t the expropr ia tor i s exerc is ing 
t h e p o l i c e power . The r i g h t s 
of a c c e s s , l i g h t , and a i r a r e 
easements appurtenant to the land 
of an abu t t ing owner on a s t r e e t ; 
t h e y c o n s t i t u t e p r o p e r t y r i g h t s 
forming pa r t of the owner's e s t a t e . 
These subs t an t i a l property r i g h t s , 
a l t h o u g h s u b j e c t t o r e a s o n a b l e 
r e g u l a t i o n , may not be taken away 
or impaired without j u s t compensation, 
[ c i t ing the case of Hampton v. S ta te 
Road Commission, supra] (p. 929) 
S u r e l y , t he t a k i n g of the p r o p e r t y r i g h t of access cannot be 
held non-compensable simply because no piece of land i s phys ica l ly 
expropr ia ted . 
The next y e a r , in 1975, t h i s Court decided Ba i l ey 
Se rv i ce & Supply v . The Sta te of Utah, 533 P.2d 882. In t ha t 
case there was no physical taking of proper ty . The cons t ruc t ion 
of a v i a d u c t down a p u b l i c s t r e e t made i t impossible for the 
owner to have access with long t r a c t o r - t r a i l e r s , as he had been 
a b l e to do when the whole s t r e e t was a v a i l a b l e . His access 
p o i n t or driveway was not closed or impaired. The Court again 
used the language of " taking" and did not d iscuss "damage" to 
the p l a i n t i f f ' s r i g h t of access . The Court held: 
P r i o r d e c i s i o n s of t h i s c o u r t 
have e s t a b l i s h e d t h e p r i n c i p l e 
t h a t t h e r e can be no r e c o v e r y 
from the S t a t e for damages where 
t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t he highway 
o r t h e e r e c t i o n of s t r u c t u r e s 
w i t h i n t h e p u b l i c r i g h t of way 
i m p a i r o r a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t t he 
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convenience of access to the property 
of an abutting owner. (p. 883) 
Perhaps the distinguishing feature is that there was no blocking 
of the customary means of access but only a limitation of the 
type of vehicle which could use that means of access or that 
the damage was not specific enough or great enough. 
Appellants ask the Court to consider that where the 
established routes of access are blocked, there is either a 
taking or a damage in the Constitutional sense and relief should 
be given either by inverse condemnation or under Section 6 of 
the Governmental Immunity Act. The damage here is much greater 
in amount than in the Miya case, supra, and is more direct than 
in Bailey because here there was complete closing of the established 
access route. The use of the property, constructed in reliance 
on the parking spaces, had to be changed from retail servicing 
customers or else parking had to be acquired. In the Three 
D case, the lessee went to off-premise services. In the Distributors 
case, the owners sold the building as a means of acquiring off-
street parking adjacent to the building to enable them to continue 
their retail use. Their loss was $64,000. 
POINT V 
IS THERE DENIAL OF REASONABLE ACCESS WHERE 
PARKING SPACES ACCESSIBLE FROM THE STREET 
ARE MADE INACCESSIBLE DIRECTLY? 
The position of appellants is that what occurred on 
13 0 0 South Street was a taking of the easement of access which 
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the appellants had to their parking spaces. We have used the 
words "impairment" and "restriction" but suggest that a more 
appropriate phrase is that the established means of access were 
"blocked." 
We have cited several cases where the established 
means of access were closed and there was substituted an indirect 
or circuitous route of access and where also, as in the Keiffer 
case, supra, the number of usable parking spaces was reduced. 
These cases are as follows: Keiffer v. King County; 
Finkelstein v. Commonwealth; Farris v. City of Twin Falls; Oklahoma 
Turnpike Authority v. Chandler; City of Chicago v. Holt; Filler 
v. City of Minot; and Miller v. City of Beaver Falls. 
We are not aware of any cases where the established 
access was blocked and new approaches were given to reach the 
property where recovery was denied. 
POINT VI 
SHOULD THE COORT ROLE THAT A PHYSICAL TAKING 
IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF RECOVERY WHERE THE 
CITY ATTEMPTS TO DO IN TWO SEPARATE PROCEEDINGS 
WHAT IT STARTED OUT TO DO IN A SINGLE PROCEEDING? 
In Springville Banking v. Burton and other Road Commis-
sioners, supra, action was brought in mandamus against the individual 
Road Commissioners as a means of avoiding sovereign immunity 
which protected the State from direct attack. The Court said: 
We believe and hold that the procedure 
chosen by plaintiff was an effort 
indirectly to do that which repeatedly 
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we have held could not be done 
directly, which is dispositive 
of this case on that ground, 
(p. 102) 
This argument was made to the trial court in the Memorandum 
Supporting Motion for New Trial (Tr. 162-163) in support of 
Requested Finding No. 13. 
It is very plain that Salt Lake City commenced this 
Special Improvement District intending to take a piece of property 
from all of the abutting owners. (See pages 18 to 19) The 
original appraisal made for Salt Lake City included damages 
for destroying parking rights incident to the taking (Ex. D-17, 
Parcel 106 P.6, Parcel 107, p. 6) Civil Action No. 228714 of 
the Third Judicial District, of which the Court took judicial 
notice (Tr. 233) , is illustrative of how a jury can weigh destruction 
of parking rights in connection with a physical taking of property. 
This Court's case of Utah State Road Commission v. Miya, supra, 
shows plainly that where there is a physical taking, damages 
for impairment of easement will also be included. 
The unfinished, incompleted aspects of the Improvement 
District are plain from the photographs in evidence (Ex's. D-25, 
D-30, D-36, P-39, P-40 and D-41) as evidence that ultimately 
the second step will have to be taken before the street widening 
projects can really be called an "improvement district." 
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CONCLUSION 
The Findings of Fact as made are incomplete and it 
was an error to refuse to make the additional Findings as requested. 
This Court should either accept the additional requested Findings 
or remand the case for completion of the Findings. 
The clearly established facts refute the Conclusions 
of Law that there was no taking, that the substituted routes 
of access were reasonable and that there was no compensable 
damage. The Improvement District is not completed in front 
of appellants1 properties where there is no sidewalk, no gutter 
and only difficult driveway entrances. Completion of the Improvement 
District will require physical appropriation of parts of appellants1 
properties, which entire process would entitle appellants to 
recover damage to parking rights under the theory relied on 
by the respondent, namely: The City can block appellants" estab-
lished rights of way and parking spaces so long as their real 
estate is not physically appropriated and so long as any type 
of access is given to the parking area which has been blocked 
off; the compelled change of use of appellants1 buildings and 
the great damage to their property values is non-compensable; 
and when the improvements are completed the parking rights will 
already have been destroyed. 
This Court should reject that sophistry and hold that 
blocking out established access to parking spaces, in reliance 
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upon which the buildings were constructed, is a taking under 
the Utah Constitution and where the indirect access afforded 
results in substantial damage to property values and to the 
best use of the property, that damage should be determined and 
awarded and the case should be remanded for determination of 
that damage. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP 
Attorneys for Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
was served on the respondent this 18th day of March, 1987, by 
mailing four (4) true and correct copies thereof via United 
States Mail with postage prepaid thereon to Arthur L. Keesler, 
Jr., Esquire, Assistant City Attorney, 125 Circuit Court Building, 
425 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, attorney for 
respondent. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THREE D CORPORATION, a Utah : 
corporation, et al.f MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiffs, CIVIL NO. C-84-3228 
vs • 
SALT LAKE CITY, a 
municipal corporation, : 
Defendant. : 
I understand the allegations of the Complaint to be as follows: 
Plaintiffs own real property located on 1300 South in Salt Lake 
City, and maintain a business thereon. Directly in front of the 
business are thirteen parking spaces which have been used by 
plaintiffs1 customers for a number of years. 
In June of 1983 the City commenced widening 1300 South. 
None of plaintiffs' property was "taken" in the literal sense, but 
access to the property was limited, allegedly to the point that 
the parking spaces cannot be used. 
The City has moved to dismiss on the basis that plaintiff 
has not complied with the Governmental Immunity Act. Plaintiff 
admits that it has not. The issue, therefore, is whether the 
Governmental Immunity Act is applicable. 
-47-
pitfHREE D CORP. , ET AL 
V. SALT LAKE CITY PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Whether the Governmental Immunity Act applies depends upon 
whether the actions of the City amount to a "taking" or are 
merely an exercise of the police power resulting in consequential 
damages. The cases on this point are somewhat confusing. In 
Hampton v. State Road Comm'n., 21 Utah 2d 342, 445 P.2d 708 
(1968), the Supreme Court held that blocking access to a driveway 
with a fence and guardrail 4*a& a "taking." In Holt v. Utah State 
Road Comm'n., 30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P.2d 1286 (1973), it was held 
that construction of an underpass which impaired access was not a 
"taking." In Utah State Road Comm'n. v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 
(1974) construction of a viaduct which impaired the abutting 
property owner's view was a "taking." In Bailey Service & Supply 
Corp. v. State, 533 P.2d 882 (Utah 1973), the Court reversed a 
plaintiff's verdict on the basis that construction of a viaduct 
which prevented large trucks from access to a warehouse was not a 
"taking." Springville Baking Co. v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d 100, 
349 P.2d 157, held that construction of an island which impaired 
access was not a "taking." 
The common thread that runs through these cases is that a 
landowner is not entitled to use every foot of his frontage for 
access, nor does he have a right to travel in any particular 
direction from his property or to use any particular part of the 
public right-of-way. But he is entitled to reasonable access to 
his property. 
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THREE D CORP., ET AL 
V. SALT LAKE CITY PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Taking the allegations of the Complaint alone, it cannot be 
said that a cause of action is not stated. It remains to be seen 
whether the facts will bear out a taking in the legal sense. 
The Motion to Dismiss is denied. Mr. Bird is requested to 
prepare an appropriate Order, and submit it to Mr. Maughan 
pursuant to Rule 2.9. 
Dated this 2 / day of July, 1984. 
<yxwft 
SCe¥T TrKPTlELS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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THREE D CORP., ET AL 
VS. SALT LAKE CITY PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the following, 
this 3( day of July, 1984: 
Richard L. Bird 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
333 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Paul G. Maughan 
Attorney for Defendant 
100 City & County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
V/.'O1- .— kJAf^.O. 
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Sa!tLv.2'~c< -, -" \ 
Richard L. Bird, Jr. (#0338) 
David J. Bird (#0334) 
RICHARDS, BIRD & KOMP 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
333 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-8987 
By j\h U2. 
FEB 3 1986 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THREE D CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, DISTRIBUTORS 
INC. UTAH, a Utah corporation, 
and LORIN S. MILLER, d/b/a 
WESTERN BATTERY MANUFACTURING, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C84-3228 
JUDGE SCOTT DANIELS 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before 
the Third Judicial District Court of the State of Utah, the 
Honorable Scott Daniels presiding, on the 27th day of November, 
1985. The trial was then continued to the 2nd day of December, 
1985, and then further continued to the 4th day of December, 
1985. Plaintiffs were represented by counsel Richard L. Bird, 
Jr., and the defendant was represented by Arthur L. Keesler, 
Jr., Assistant City Attorney. Plaintiffs were allowed to amend 
their Complaint by including Ted R. Brown and Warren B. Brown, 
Trustee, as owners of the property at 234 West 1300 South and 
-51- 000136 
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Distributors Inc, a Colorado corporation, as parties plaintiff* 
The Court, after reviewing the evidence, including the testimony 
of all of the witnesses, and the arguments of counsel, hereby 
enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Three D Corporation is the owner of real property 
located at 238 West 1300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
2. Warren B. Brown, Trustee, and Ted R. Brown are 
now the owners of real property located at 234 West 1300 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, which property is under lease to Distributors 
Inc. Colorado and Distributors Inc. Utah. 
3. On June 1, 1983, defendant commenced the construction 
of a Special Improvement District which provided for the installation 
of curb and gutter and the widening of the roadway of 1300 South 
Street. 
4. In order to widen the boundaries of 1300 South 
Street between 200 and 300 West Streets in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
the defendant attempted to purchase a portion of plaintiffs1 
property which fronted on said street. 
5. The plaintiffs refused to sell any portion of 
their frontage property for the street widening project unless 
they were paid for damage to their property from loss of parking 
spaces. As a result, the City extended the roadway, widening 
only to the existing boundaries of 1300 South Street and no 
00013^ 
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portion of the roadway or curb was constructed upon property 
owned by the defendants. Two curb cuts were made allowing plaintiffs 
continued access to their property. 
6. Building permits were issued by Salt Lake City 
in 1956 as to Three D Corporation and in 1957 as to what is 
now the Brown property based upon applications with plot plans 
attached showing parking at the south end of the buildings on 
the owners' property accessible from the street, six (6) parking 
spaces in front of the Three D building and seven (7) parking 
spaces in front of the Distributors Inc. building, as shown 
on some of the exhibits. 
7. The building of each plaintiff was constructed 
with offices and areas for serving drop-in customers with sales 
and services, which buildings were so used from 1956 as to the 
Three D building and from 1957 as to the Distributors Inc. building. 
^y^ 8. The placing of the curb at the property lines 
of the plaintiffs has prevented plaintiffs and their customers 
from driving from 1300 South Street directly into each of their 
angle parking spaces. 
v*o 9. The placing of the cuts in the said curb permits 
plaintiffs and their customers to drive across and onto the 
spaces where there was formerly parking almost perpendicular 
to the property line of 1300 South Street and parking a vehicle 
parallel to 1300 South Street, greatly reducing the number of 
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parking spaces that can be utilized. 
M} 10. In the case of plaintiff Three D's property, 
a vehicle now parking in front of the building cannot go forward 
but must back out to the curb cut; and in the case of the Brown 
property, such a vehicle must go forward and cannot back out 
without going beyond plaintiff's property. 
K& 11. None of the routes of access to parking available 
to plaintiffs and their customers before the curbs were put 
in by the defendant is now available. 
^ 12. The loss of parking spaces resulting from the 
building of the curb has damaged the businesses conducted on 
the premises and has reduced the value of the properties to 
a substantial extent. 
+jb 13. The curb cuts placed for access to the properties 
of plaintiffs have approximately four-inch (4") verticle face, 
whereas the curb cuts to all other properties on the 13 00 South 
Street project have a rounding face of approximately one-inch 
(1") height, making use of said curb cuts unpleasant and difficult. 
Q\t 14. The resultant conditions of the proper-tries of 
the plaintiffs are that water from th^ir properties and from 
the gutter in front of the other properties now washes on to 
the front Q£ ffhe property of plaintiffs and accumulates there 
without draining, -and there is a sidewalk in front of all the 
other properties on 1300 South Street except in front of the 
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properties of plaintiffs, as shown on the photographs in evidence. 
0 ^ 15. Lorin Miller is the Lessee of Three D Corporation 
and claims damage to his leasehold interest because of the loss 
of parking involved in this action. 
16. Said roadway widening eliminated the continued 
use of plaintiffs1 property as a parking area adjacent to the 
front of plaintiffs' properties. However, two curb cuts were 
constructed so as to provide access to the subject properties 
from the roadway. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. No private citizen has any particular right to 
use a particular part of the roadway to get on his property 
in any particular way, to have the use of his property in any 
particular fashion, to have parking in one part of it, or to 
drive in in another part of it. 
2. The installation of the high back curb in front 
of plaintiffs1 property on 1300 South did not restrict the access 
to plaintiffs1 property so unreasonably as to make it a taking 
within the meaning of Utah law. 
3. Although plaintiffs suffered considerable damage 
by the loss of their available parking, they did have access 
to their property from the public roadway. 
4. The ordinances cited by the defendant, specifically 
Chapter 9 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
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1955, and Section 6-1-43f Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 1944, do not apply. 
5. The action by the defendant in installing a high 
back curb in front of plaintiffs1 property constitutes a valid 
exercise of the police power of the municipality and therefore 
no right of action exists against the municipality. 
6. Plaintiffs have failed to show a taking, and 
in the absence of any taking, the plaintiffs cannot recover. 
DATED this day of December, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS 
Approved as to Form; 
Arthur L. Keesler, Jr. 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law were served on the defendant this / f day 
of December, 19 85, by -wailing a true and correct copy thereof 
j^rdi—UniLed—States—Mai4—with pootagc prepaid—thorson to Arthur 
E. Keesler, Jr., Esquire, Assistant City Attorney, 100 Cit} 
and County Building, Salt Lake .City, Utah 84111, attorney foi 
defendant. 
—^WACA/ 
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FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lane Coun:v i.'tsin 
JAN 3 0 1986 
H. Dixrfn H.ndleyJS.srk 3 * Dc:. Court 
Csputy Cterx ARTHUR L. KEESLER, JR. , #1781 A s s i s t a n t C i t y At torney 
A t t o r n e y f o r Defendant 
100 C i t y & County B u i l d i n g 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
Te lephone: (801) 535 -7788 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THREE 
Utah 
INC. , 
-D CORPORATION, a ) 
c o r p o r a t i o n , DISTRIBUTORS ) 
a 
LORIN S. 
BATTERY 
SALT 
corpo 
v s 
Utah c o r p o r a t i o n , ) 
. MILLER, d / b / a WESTERN ) 
MANUFACTURING, ) 
P l a i n t i f f s , ) 
• / 
LAKE CITY, a m u n i c i p a l ) 
r a t i o n , ) 
Defendant* ) 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF IAW 
C i v i l No. C84-3228 
Judge S c o t t D a n i e l s 
The a b o v e - e n t i t l e d m a t t e r came on f o r t r i a l b e f o r e t h e Third 
J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court of the S t a t e of Utah, t h e Honorable S c o t t 
D a n i e l s p r e s i d i n g , on t h e 27th day of November, 1985. The t r i a l 
was then c o n t i n u e d t o the 2nd day of December, 198 5, and then 
f u r t h e r c o n t i n u e d to t h e 4 th day of December, 1985 . P l a i n t i f f s 
were r e p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l Richard B i r d , J r . , and t h e d e f e n d a n t 
was r e p r e s e n t e d by Arthur L. K e e s l e r , J r . , A s s i s t a n t C i ty 
A t t o r n e y . P l a i n i f f s were a l lowed to amend t h e i r Complaint by 
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including Ted R. Brown and Warren B. Brown, Trustee, as owners of 
the property at 234 West 1300 South and Distributors Inc., a 
Colorado corporation, as parties plaintiff* The Court, after 
reviewing the evidence, including the testimony of all of the 
witnesses, and the arguments of counsel, hereby enters the 
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Three-D Corporation is the owner of real property 
located at 238 West 1300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
2. Warren B. Brown, Trustee, and Ted R. Brown are now the 
owners of real property located at 234 West 1300 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, which property is under lease to Distributors Inc. 
Colorado and Distributors Inc. Utah. 
3. On June 1, 1983, defendant commenced the construction of 
a Special Improvement District which provided for the installa-
tion of curb and gutter and the widening of the roadway of 1300 
South Street. 
4. In order to widen the boundaries of 1300 South Street 
between 200 and 300 West Streets in Salt Lake City, Utah, the 
defendant attempted to purchase a portion of plaintiffs1 property 
which fronted on said said street. 
5. The plaintiffs refused to sell any portion of their 
frontage property for the street widening project unless they 
were paid for damage to their property from loss of parking 
-2-
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spaces . As a r e s u l t , the City extended the roadway, widening 
only to the ex i s t i ng boundaries of 1300 South S t ree t and no 
por t ion of the roadway or curb was constructed upon property 
owned by the defendants . Two curb cuts were made allowing 
p l a i n t i f f s continued access to t h e i r proper ty . 
6. The bui lding of each p l a i n t i f f was constructed with 
o f f ices and areas for serving drop-in customers with sa l e s and 
s e r v i c e s , which bui ldings were so used from 1956 as to the Three 
D bui lding and from 1957 as to the D i s t r i bu to r s Inc . bu i ld ing . 
7. The placing of the curb a t the property l i n e s of the 
p l a i n t i f f s has prevented p l a i n t i f f s and t h e i r customers from 
driving from 1300 South S t ree t d i r e c t l y in to each of t he i r angle 
parking spaces . 
8. Lorin Mil le r i s the Lessee of Three D Corporation and 
claims damage to h i s leasehold i n t e r e s t because of the loss of 
parking involved in t h i s a c t i on . 
9. Sa id roadway w i d e n i n g e l i m i n a t e d t h e c o n t i n u e d u s e of 
p l a i n t i f f s ' p r o p e r t y a s a p a r k i n g a r e a a d j a c e n t t o t h e f r o n t of 
p l a i n t i f f s ' p r o p e r t i e s . However/ two c u r b c u t s were c o n s t r u c t e d 
s o a s t o p r o v i d e a c c e s s t o t h e s u b j e c t p r o p e r t i e s form t h e 
r o a d w a y . 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 . No p r i v a t e c i t i z e n h a s any p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t t o use a 
p a r t i c u l a r p a r t of t h e roadway t o g e t on h i s p r o p e r t y i n any 
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particular way, to have the use of his property in any particular 
fashion, to have parking in one part of it, or to drive in in 
another part of it. 
2. The installation of the high back curb in front of 
plaintiffs' property on 1300 South did not restrict the access to 
plaintiffs1 property so unreasonably as to make it a taking 
within the meaning of Utah law. 
3. Although plaintiffs suffered considerable damage by the 
loss of their available parking, they did have access to their 
property from the public roadway. 
4. The ordinances cited by the defendant, specifically 
Chapter 9 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
1955, and Section 6-1-43, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 1944, do not apply. 
5. The action by the defendant in installing a high back 
curb in front of plaintiffs1 property constitutes a valid 
exercise of the police power of the municipality and therefore no 
right of action exists against the municipality. 
6. Plaintiffs have failed to show a taking, and in the 
absence of any taking, the plaintiffs cannot recover. 
DATED this ^jQ) day of January, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS 
ATTEST 
_4 _ H. DiXON rw**iiLSt 
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^tr. Approved as to Form; 
RicHard L. Bird, Jr. 
Attorney for Plaintifts 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to Richard L. Bird, Jr., 
Attorney for Plaintiffs, at 333 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111, by depositing the same in the U.S. mail, postage 
prepaid thereon, this *?/$T day of January, 1986. 
"Tysjafi (?JAMJ2^U^J 
rc20 
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R i c h a r d L. B i r d , J r . (#0338) 
David J . B i r d (#0334) 
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP 
A t t o r n e y s f o r P l a i n t i f f 
333 E a s t F o u r t h S o u t h 
S a l t Lake C i t y , U tah 84111 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 328-8987 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THREE D CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, DISTRIBUTORS 
INC. UTAH, a Utah corporation, 
and LORIN S. MILLER, d/b/a 
WESTERN BATTERY MANUFACTURING, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Civil No. C84-3228 
JUDGE SCOTT DANIELS 
Pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
plaintiffs move for a new trial in this action for reasons of 
insufficiency of the evidence to justify the decision and that 
the decision is contrary to law, both in granting the motion 
to dismiss and in failing to make the Findings of Fact as requested 
by the plaintiffs. 
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DATED this J^(~ day of January, 1986. 
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP 
Richard L. Bird, (jj*f. 
By /)+S/£~ 
DaVid J . Bird 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify the foregoing MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
was served on the defendant this 2 7 day of January, 1986, 
by mailing a true and correct copy thereof via United States 
Mail with postage prepaid thereon to Arthur L. Keesler, Jr., 
Esquire, Assistant City Attorney, 100 City and County Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, attorney for defendant. 
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FILMED 
Richard L. Bird, Jr. (#0338) 
David J. Bird (#0334) 
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
333 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-8987 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utali 
DEC 3 1986 
n
 D&putv G.erk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THREE D CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, DISTRIBUTORS 
INC. UTAH, a Utah corporation, 
and LORIN S. MILLER, d/b/a 
WESTERN BATTERY MANUFACTURING, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Civil No. C84-3228 
JUDGE SCOTT DANIELS 
The Motion of plaintiffs for a new trial made and 
filed on January 27, 1986, having been submitted on a Memorandum 
supporting the position of plaintiffs, and the Court having 
had the matter under advisement and having considered the Motion 
and the Memorandum submitted by the plaintiffs; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for New Trial 
be and hereby is denied. 
DATED this ~S day of November, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
ATTEST 
H. DiXON HlNULEY 
/ cw*n 
urn 
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SCOTT DANIELS, District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify the foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL was served on the defendant this 5 *-*> day of 
Nuvuiuber, 1986, by mailing a true and correct copy thereof via 
United States Mail with postage prepaid thereon to Arthur L. Keesler, 
Jr., Esquire, Assistant City Attorney, 125 Circuit Court Building, 
425 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, attorney for 
defendant. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF ADDENDUM 
I hereby certify the foregoing ADDENDUM to Brief of 
Appellants was served on the respondent this 20th day of March, 
1987, by mailing four (4) true and correct copies thereof via 
United States Mail with postage prepaid thereon to Arthur L. Keesler, 
Jr., Esquire, Assistant City Attorney, 125 Circuit Court Building, 
425 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, attorney for 
respondent. 
